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THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION: PUTTING THE
EDUCATION BACK INTO BROWN f/.
BOARD OF EDUCATION
T. Alexander Aleinikojj1'

SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION. Edited by Derrick Bell. New York: Teachers College
Press. 1980. Pp. x, 150. $11.95.
Brown v. Board of Education 1 has been a conundrum from the
start. Perhaps no Supreme Court decision reaches a more unassailably just holding with less scholarly support for its reasoning. 2 Depending on one's view of what it promised, Brown is either a
monument to the law's power to change social conditions or a beacon on a distant ridge of unfulfilled hopes. 3 The desegregation of
public schools has required massive judicial involvement in the restructuring of social institutions. Yet, nearly three decades after
Brown, racially segregated schools remain the norm in many American cities.4
In Shades of Brown, Derrick Bell has collected eight essays that
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1974, Swarthmore College;
J.D. 1977, Yale University. - Ed.
I would like to thank Vincent Blasi, Christina Whitman, and Michael Rosenzweig for their
thoughtful co=ents on an earlier draft.
l. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955); Kurland, "Brown v.
Board of Education Was the Beginning:" The School Desegregation Cases in the United Stales
Supreme Court: 1954-1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 316-20; Pollak, Racial Discrimination and
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. l (1959); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. l (1959).
3. Compare Bell, p. viii ("The Brown decision has accomplished much that is worthwhile,
but the twenty-fifth anniversary of that decision has come and gone, leaving in its wake more
basis for commiseration than celebration."), with N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION:
ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 127 (1978) (''The promise of Brown was realized.
Black children may not be denied admittance to any school on account of their race • • • .").
4. See Bell, p. viii:
More than half of the nation's seven million black students reside in the 100 largest
school districts. Over two million of these black children attend schools in the nation's
twenty largest urban districts. Nine out often of them are attending predominantly black
schools. The twenty largest districts average about 60 percent nonwhite, and many major
districts, like Atlanta, Detroit, and Chicago, are more than 80 percent nonwhite.
See also U.S. COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 1954-19?? 31 (1981)
(while percentage of black students attending majority-white schools has increased from 23%
in 1968 to 38% in 1978, in the 1978-1979 school year 60.2% of all minority students attended
schools that were at least 50% minority and 37% attended schools that were at least 80%
minority).
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argue it is time to reassess the promise and progress of Brown. That
promise, the authors assert, was primarily one of a better education
for black children. Yet Brown has come to stand more· for racial
balance and busing than for a quality education. Shades oJBrown is
an attempt to set a new course - "to uncover remedies supported by
Brown along heretofore uncharted routes" (p. ix).
Bell recognizes that the view that Brown mandates books, not
buses, is likely to draw fire from the civil rights community, which
has souglit strenuously to maintain a united front. 5 But Bell and his
coauthors believe that black parents are increasingly disenchanted
with busing and that no solid empirical evidence establishes that
busing substantially improves the quality of education. These concerns, together with strong white opposition to busing, suggest the
need to consider alternative remedial strategies. Thus the essayists
are willing to "depart from the unwritten civil rights Commandment:
Thou shalt not publicly criticize" (p. ix). An evaluation of their proposals requires first a revisit with the history of Brown and its
aftermath.
I.

FROM EQUALIZATION TO INTEGRATION

The road to Brown was carefully planned, brilliantly executed,
and appropriately conservative. The litigation strategy adopted by
the NAACP attorneys in the early part of this century has had a
significant, if not a determinative, impact on the development of
post-Brown remedies. From the start the school litigation had two
intertwined goals: better schools for black children and integration.
Brown, when it arrived, was not just a school case; it was the
NAACP's flagship in its attack on Jim Crow in all its social
manifestations.
The chief obstacle to ending segregation was the Supreme
Court's 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 6 which held that separate-but-equal facilities for blacks and whites did not offend the
fourteenth amendment. Plessy spawned scores of suits demonstrating the inequality of facilities provided to blacks.7 These cases, how5. See, e.g., Jones,School Desegregation, 86 YALE L.J. 378 (1976) (letter to the editor). The
most celebrated case in which anti-busing heathens were thrown out of the civil rights temple
occurred in 1973 in Atlanta. When the local NAACP chapter approved a plan calling for a
drastic reduction in busing in exchange for more black school administrators, the national
NAACP office suspended the Atlanta office. See J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 233
(1979).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. These cases are collected in Larson, The New Law efRace Relations, 1969 WIS. L. REv.
470, 482-83 n.27; Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schoo/s-1953, 67 HARV. L. REv.
377, 430-35 (1954).
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ever, tended to produce court orders requiring equalization, rather
than integration. P!essy demanded no more.
In the second quarter of this century, the NAACP began to craft
a litigation strategy that sought integration, not simply equalization
of separate facilities. 8 The litigators decided to launch their attack
on the graduate and professional school level. There, the general
lack of any facilities for black students would give the courts nothing
to "equalize." Since states were unlikely to "build a cyclotron for
one student," 9 victory at the graduate level seemed to assure a court
order requiring the segregated institution to admit the black plaintiff.
The graduate strategy had the additional benefit of demanding integration in its most modest form: the entry of a single black student
into an all-white program - a far less threatening prospect than the
mixing of separate black and white school systems. In cases where
states had provided separate, but vastly inferior, graduate programs
for blacks, the NAACP began to argue that the educational opportunity provided in the black institution was necessarily inferior to what
would be offered in an integrated program. The plan produced important victories in United States ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 10 Sweatt v.
Painter,1 1 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. 12
In 1950, the NAACP attorneys turned their attention to their primary goal: desegregation of elementary and secondary schools. The
existence of separate black school systems made the achievement of
integration far less certain, since courts were likely to hold that
Plessy demanded only equalization. In Sweatt the NAACP had argued that Plessy was no longer controlling, but the Supreme Court
had ruled for the plaintiffs without reconsidering the earlier decision.13 In order to bring down Jim Crow schools with one bold
stroke, the NAACP lawyers had to persuade the Court thatP!essyat least in the field of education - was no longer good law.
The civil rights litigators gave the Court two choices. They made
a direct assault on Plessy, arguing that segregation constituted an
arbitrary classification based on race and was thus per se unconstitu8. See generally J. GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SoCIAL CHANGE 49-89 (1977).
9. Kelly, The School .Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CoNSTl·
(J. Garranty ed. 1964) (quoting Oklahoma University President George L.
Cross).
10. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
11. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
12. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
13. 339 U.S. at 636.

TUTION 243, 254-55
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tional. 14 But they also provided the Court with an argument that did
not call for the express overruling of Plessy. Relying upon findings
and testimony in the district courts, 15 the NAACP asserted that segregation inflicted psychological harm on black schoolchildren
whether or not the physical school facilities provided to blacks and
whites were equal. 16 As Robert Carter told the Supreme Court at
oral argument: "Here we abandon any claim . . . of any constitutional inequality which comes from anything other than the act of
segregation itself." 17 If segregation, ipso facto, created inequality,
thenP!essy did not apply. Furthermore, equalization of the separate
school systems could not be an effective remedy. 18 The Constitution
demanded one school system - i e. , integration.
The Court, as all know, held that separate schools for blacks and
whites are inherently unequal. Its approach was no doubt counseled
by caution. It did not expressly abandon Plessy, and held only that
"in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place." 19 An alternative holding that state-enforced separation of the races was a per se constitutional violation would have
proscribed segregation everywhere.20 Because it focused on the educational harm caused.by segregation, the Court could be seen as taking the limited step of condemning only segregated schools.
The determination that separate schools were inherently unequal
naturally suggested an integration remedy. Had the Court found
that the constitutional harm had arisen solely from the insult of assignment by race, any neutral school assignment plan would have
satisfied the fourteenth amendment. But if segregated schools were
by definition inferior schools, ending assignment by race would not
be sufficient where it did not yield integrated schools. Pragmatic and
14. Brief for Appellant at 6-8, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in
49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (P.
Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975).
15. See 347 U.S. at 494 & n.10.
16. The district court in Brown found that the black and white schools in Topeka were
effectively equal in terms of physical plant, educational programs, and quality of teachers.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951) (three-judge court).
17. Quoted in ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55 at 13 (L. Friedman ed. 1969).
18. Brief for Appellant (Brown v. Board of Educ.), supra_ note 14, at 8-13. See Brief for
Appellant, Briggs v. Elliott (companion case ofBrown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)),
reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 12-16 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975).
19. 347 U.S. at 495.
20. Of course, the subsequentper curiam opinions desegregating public parks, beaches and
buses made clear that Brown was not limited to schools. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
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paternalistic considerations also supported an integrationist remedial
strategy. One could assume that white-dominated school districts
would look after schools attended by white children. Ensuring that
black children attended the same schools as white children thus
made it more likely that black children would receive an adequate
education. As Bell has noted elsewhere, "to get what the white kids
have, you must go where the white kids are." 21 Integrating the
schools also lessened the courts' remedial duties. Rather than evaluating whether white and black schools were in fact providing equal
resources and programs, courts could guarantee equality by placing
blacks and whites in the same schools, where every child would receive the same educational package. The choice for integration was
further supported by the prevailing belief that black children would
learn better if they were exposed to white children. 22 The ideal
America, in short, was one in which diverse groups lived as neighbors - sharing schools, friends, and an ideology of equality.23
Whether these considerations alone would have produced a virtual requirement of integrated public schools, massive Southern
resistance to Brown (or token compliance with it) ensured the result.
Thus, while an early interpretation of Brown held that it required
only an end to racial assignment, not integration,24 the Fifth Circuit
21. Bell, School Litigation Strategiesfar the 1970's: New Phases in the Continuing Questfor
Quality Schools, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 257, 275.
22. See J. WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 46. One court has termed this notion the "osmosis
effect." Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
23. The integration remedy may also be viewed as a reaction to radical black groups who
argued in the 1960s and 1970s that separate schools run by and for blacks would be a more
effective remedy for past discrimination in education than integration in a white-dominated
school system. The Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) filed an amicus brief in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971), which argued:
Integration, as it is designed, places the Black child in the position of implied inferiority. Not only is he asked to give up much of his culture and identity, but with the
dispersal of Blacks he loses many of the communal ties which have traditionally been the
cornerstone of the Black community. Moreover, there can never be true integration between groups until there is a real parity relationship existing between them.
White schools at this time do not constitute the kind of environment which can foster
the healthy development of Black children. White school boards make it difficult for even
Black schools to respond to the special needs of Black children. In this respect, however,
many Black teachers and administrators have tried, within the narrow limits allowed
them, to satisfy these needs.
With the guarantee of equal resources and with the freedom to proceed as is expedient, Black schools would be a superior learning environment and could graduate students
who can succeed in an interracial world.
Brief for CORE as Amicus Curiae, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I
(1971), reprinted in EDUCATION FOR WHOM? 205 (C. Tesconi & E. Hurwitz eds. 1974), See
generally C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 195-208 (3d ed. 1974).
24. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (three-judge court).
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resoundingly rejected this view. 25 Soon thereafter, the Supreme
Court required integration in everything but name in Green v.. County
School Board. 26 In Green, the Court held that a freedom-of-choice
assignment plan that maintained the pre-existing pattern of segregated schools did not satisfy Brown. School systems that were segregated by law in 1954 would have to be dismantled "root and
branch."27 Although subsequent cases continued to speak the language of desegregation, they made clear that the only acceptable
remedy for unlawful dual school systems was, in fact, integration.2 8
Thus remedial, pragmatic, and moral considerations all helped to
transform Brown into a case that effectively mandated integration.
This is not to say that a choice was being made between education
and integration. Consistent with the language of Brown, the strategy
of the NAACP, and the prevailing liberal ideology, integration was
viewed as guaranteeing equality of educational opportunity.29 A
quarter century of experience, however, has produced revisionism in
the civil rights ranks. White opposition to busing plans, the frustration experienced by courts in supervising decrees in the face of shifting demographic data, and doubts about whether integration
demonstrably improves educational performance have led some to
reassess the progress of Brown.
Shades ofBrown is a dramatic example of that reassessment. The
essays, presented in earlier versions at a 1978 Harvard Law School
symposium, tell different-parts of the story. Several note the transformation of Brown from an education to a busing case.30 Others
assert that a proper appreciation of the nature of racial discrimination would produce remedies that demand equality of results, not
merely integration.31 Two educators argue that black children need
25. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 846 n.5, 861-78 (1966);
q/fd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
26. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
27. 391 U.S. at 438.
28. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See Keyes v.
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 219-23 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See generally L. GRAOLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976); Fiss, School Desegregation:
The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & Pull. AFF. 3 (1974).
29. Derrick Bell has described this development in an earlier piece:
Somewhere in the struggle to overcome the fierce resistance to desegregation, civil
rights lawyers and others, and particularly the courts, began to equate the elimination of
the dual school system with the attainment of equal educational opportunity.
Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 341, 344 (1975).
30. E.g., Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, p. 90; Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Rationalization, p. 70; Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties
ofMeaning, p. 30.
31. E.g., Freeman, supra note 30; Lawrence, "One More River to Cross" - Recognizing the
Real Injury in Brown: A Prerefjllisite to Shaping New Remedies, p. 48.
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not .attend an integrated school to receive an effective education. 32
Finally, Bell offers a model alternative desegregation plan that concentrates on education instead of on racial balance. 33 This Review
will evaluate several of the essays before confronting the book's central thesis. 34

II. A

SAMPLING OF THE NEW PERSPECTIVES

A.

''A Lawyer in the Case" 35

Robert Carter, presently a federal district judge and one of the
lawyers who argued Brown, states that the "basic postulate" of the
litigative strategy in 1954 was that "the elimination of enforced segregated education would necessarily result in equal education" (p.
23). To the NAACP, "[i]ntegrated education appeared to be an indispensable means to equal education. Indeed, to us equal education meant integrated education" (p. 22).
Carter believes that the NAACP's thesis "never had a fair test"
(p. 25) because of residential segregation in the North and resistance
to busing. While Carter believes that "integration must remain the
long-range goal," he recognizes that "the reality is that hundreds of
thousands of black children are attending all black or predominantly
black schools" (p. 26). He thus asserts that in the short-run "we have
to concentrate on finding ways of improving the quality of education
in [racially imbalanced urban] schools, even if it means or results in
less effort being expended on school integration" (p. 26).
An approach that strives to improve educational opportunities in
predominantly black schools is arguably at odds with the "separate
is inherently unequal" language of Brown. But Carter believes that
his new approach is attainable under Brown:
While we fashioned Brown on the theory that equal education and
integrated education were one and the same, the goal was not integration but equal educational opportunity. Similarly, although the
Supreme Court in 1954 believed that educational equality mandated
integration, Brown requires equal educational opportunity. If that can
be achieved without integration, Brown has been satisfied. [P. 27.]

To realize this new interpretation of Brown, Carter calls on "educators [to] articulate the indispensable ingredients of educational
32. Edmonds, Effective Education far Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Co'!firmed, p.
108; Lightfoot, Families as Educators: The Forgotten People ef Brown, p. 20.
33. Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, p. 124.
34. The two essays that argue that integrated schools are not a prerequisite for effective
educations for black school children, see note 32 supra, will not be reviewed.
35. This Section reviews Carter, A Reassessment ef Brown v. Board, p. 21.
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equality to enable judges and lawyers to develop an accommodating
constitutional doctrine" (p. 26). That doctrine, according to Carter,
should go beyond simply guaranteeing equality of inputs (such as
per capita expenditures, curriculum, and quality of instruction); it
should focus as well on educational output.
The problems with Carter's approach, however, seem intractable.
While it is likely that educators could produce the desired definition
of equal educational opportunity, it is unlikely that judges will fashion a constitutional doctrine to accommodate it. To reinterpret
Brown as mandating equal educational opportunity irrespective of
the racial composition of the schools will present severe difficulties
for the courts. Under the separate-is-inherently-unequal doctrine,
equality of educational opportunity can be achieved by placing
black and white students in the same schools. Courts are not required to weigh the benefits of particular educational programs; they
must simply ensure that students of both races receive the same education, whatever the content of that education. Under Carter's strategy, courts would be thrust into the role of evaluating the merits of
educational programs provided to black and white children in separate schools.
Courts have been unwilling to embrace a constitutional theory
based upon judicial evaluation of the educational process.36 Interestingly, the NAACP brief in Briggs v. Elliott (a case argued with
Brown), specifically noted the unworkability of a remedy aimed at
equalizing educational opportunity:
Education is not an inert subject. Teachers differ in ability, personality and effectiveness, and their teachings correspondingly vary in
value. Schools differ in size, location and environment . . . . Public
education . . . is an ever-growing and progressing field. Facilities and
methods improve as experience demonstrates the need and the way.
Buildings and facilities are constantly increased to accommodate the
expanding school population. It seems clear that no two schools can
retain a constant and fixed relationship on the flux of educational progress. Certainly this relationship cannot be fixed or maintained by judicial decree. Resolution of the basic issue in this case - the right to
equal educational benefits - by an equalization decree will engage the
parties and the court interminably.37

Furthermore, many independent variables, such as family involve36. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), a.ffd per curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970);
Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), a.ffd per curiam sub nom. Mcinnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). But see Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). The argument that the fourteenth amendment guarantees a right
to an effective education is discussed in text preceding note 87 i,ifra.
37. Brief for Appellant (Briggs v. El/ioll), supra note 18, at 30.
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ment, neighborhood conditions, and teacher expectations, are likely
to affect individual academic achievement.38 Any resulting disparity
between the value of the education received in racially identifiable
schools may be difficult to attribute directly to the school authorities
and the educational program. Carter's reinterpretation of Brown
thus raises serious problems of measurement and causation problems that courts are likely to avoid by maintaining the current
view that Brown requires dismantlement of dual school systems, not
effective education.
Just as the Court in Brown could not "tum the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written,"39 neither can Carter tum the clock back to
1954 and rewrite his brief. Integration - in schools, public buildings, public parks - was the goal of the litigation strategy that
produced Brown. That is the ·way Carter argued it and the way the
Court wrote it. It is doubtful that we can get beyond Brown by
"rediscovering" it.
B.

"The Viewpoint of Histo,y" 40

Diane Ravitch, a professor at Columbia University's Teachers
College, ably reviews the NAACP's arguments in Brown. She asserts that the plaintiffs' primary argument was that state-imposed
segregation is per se unconstitutional - a position not directly answered by the Court. She labels as "secondary" the claim accepted
by the Court, that minority children are psychologically harmed by
state-imposed segregation. Ravitch states that the psychological
harm claim ran in two directions, each with different remedial implications: (1) Segregation caused harm by officially sanctioning the
doctrine of black inferiority (suggesting a remedy of color-blind policies); and (2) black school children were harmed by a lack of interaction with white children (suggesting an integration remedy) (p.
37).
Ravitch notes that this remedial ambiguity can be traced
throughout the entire record of Brown; "[i]n essence, the civil rights
lawyers were simultaneously advocating both color-blind legal
equality and color-conscious school integration" (p. 37). The ambiguity evolved into "an outright contradiction" in the quarter-century
38. See Goodman, De Facio School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis,
60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 400-35 (1972); Lightfoot, supra note 32, at pp. 11-17. See generally ON
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972),
39. 347 U.S. at 492.
40. This Section reviews Ravitch, supra note 30.
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following Brown, "since color-blind policies became, in many places,
an obstacle to school integration" (p. 37). Ravitch maintains that the
shift in the meaning of desegregation from color-blindness to colorconscious integration was due to massive resistance in the South, liberal support for an integrated society, and the notion of a "common
school ideal" that could "hasten the assimilation of minorities to
American culture" and serve as a "pillar of democracy'' by equalizing cultural and class differences (pp. 39-40). These considerations,
coupled with prevailing sociological and historical notions of the
1960s that blacks "had been culturally and psychologically damaged
by historical discrimination," lent intellectual support to the view
that a black school could not be a good school (p. 42).
In assessing the meaning of Brown today, Ravitch argues that
"we must recognize that it deals not just with the question of access
to schools, but with the question of how to define Black people and
what part Blacks should play in defining their own purposes" (p. 44).
She thus argues that "the role of government must be to provide
Blacks with the opportunity and the means to make choices for
themselves" (p. 44). Desegregation
should mean the removal of all barriers based on race, but it should
not mean the dismantling of autonomous Black institutions . . . . It
should mean a heightened consciousness of the value of interracial
contact in every sphere of activity, but it should not mean that a stigma
must be attached to any activities pursued by Blacks without the participation of non-Blacks. [P. 45]

Ravitch's essay persuasively suggests that the integrationist
model may disserve minority interests to the extent that it hampers
opportunities for the development of autonomous black institutions.
Moreover, as she notes, the intellectual underpinnings of the model
- that, as Bell states, black culture is seen "as a stigma by whites
and a handicap to blacks" (p. 30) - are open to serious challenge.
The legal implications of her approach, however, are not spelled out.
Ravitch concedes that the essay is an attempt to reexamine "the intellectual bases of social policy'' and that it "raises questions instead
of providing answers" (pp. 45-46).
·
·
The major question that it raises is: How can Ravitch's preferred
definition of "desegregation" be implemented in the context of a
school case? Her reinterpretation would appear to authorize - if
not favor - "freedom of choice" plans that eliminate school assignment based on race and permit students to attend any school within
a district. These plans, developed early on by school officials in response to post-Brown desegregation orders, were ultimately rejected
by the courts because they resulted in the maintenance of separate
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and unequal schools.41 Although Ravitch would probably not read
Brown to permit the use of freedom-of-choice plans that intentionally result in the retention of dual school systems, it is not clear how
she would distinguish benign from stigmatizing plans. One answer
may be to permit adoption of freedom-of-choice plans where minority plaintiffs request them: Blacks are not likely to feel stigmatized
by racially identifiable schools where they have chosen them as a
route to self-realization. Ravitch's reinterpretation of Brown, therefore, could form the basis for a remedial strategy that eradicates barriers based on race without mandating integration.42
But two problems remain. First, no matter how blacks view separate schools, whites may continue to view black schools as bad
schools. Thus Ravitch's solution could reinforce white perceptions
that hinder the attainment of full citizenship and equal opportunities
for blacks. More important, Ravitch's essay offers little to predominantly black inner-city school districts. Schools in such districts may
come close to Ravitch's goal of "autonomous" black institutions, but
many of them remain, in Judge Carter's words, ''woefully inadequate [in providing] tools that will enable poor blacks to become a
part of the mainstream of the social, economic, and political life of
the country" (p. 26). Ravitch's interpretation of Brown appears to do
no more for these schools than does the integrationist interpretation
that she rejects.
C. "The True Nature of Segregation"43
The thesis of Charles Lawrence's essay is that the Supreme
Court's fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of segregation
produced an incorrectly reasoned opinion in Brown and fostered an
inappropriate remedial scheme. Lawrence asserts that segregation
constitutes a per se violation of the fourteenth amendment because
its sole purpose is to label blacks as inferior. Had the Court so reasoned in Brown, it would have demanded remedies that destroyed
the system of segregation and removed the badge of inferiority. Instead, by focusing on the psychological harm caused by separation,
41. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (1966), qffd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
42. Goodman, The .Desegregation .Dilemma: A Vote far Voluntarism, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
407.
43. This Section reviews Lawrence, supra note 31. Charles Lawrence is a professor at the
San Francisco School of Law. Portions of this essay appeared in Lawrence's article,
Segregation "Misunderstood'~· The Milliken .Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. Rev. 15 (1977).
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Lawrence argues, the court necessarily adopted a more limited remedial strategy of integration (p. 52).
Lawrence's broad view of segregation as a system leads him to
criticize the Court's requirement that unlawful segregation be
demonstrated by particular segregative acts of school authorities.
For Lawrence, the insult of segregation is communicated by the entire social system that labels black schools as bad schools solely because they are attended by black children. Any state action that
reinforces a segregated society becomes relevant to determination of
the constitutional issue, including segregated housing and zoning
practices and discriminatory acts (even those outside of the particular school district) that tend to label blacks as inferior (p. 53).
Lawrence also takes issue with the Court's unwillingness to extend liability to school districts that ceased practicing segregation
before 1954. He argues that the label of inferiority remains even
after the name-calling stops. "Once the system is established," Lawrence states, "any attempt to distinguish 'active' governmental involvement in racial segregation from 'passive' or 'neutral' tolerance
of private segregation is illusory. Present passivity is merely a continuation of past actions" (p. 56).44
Lawrence's definition of the constitutional violation has obvious
implications for his views on appropriate remedies. If any state action that labels blacks as inferior contributes to a denial of equal
opportunity, all such sources of injury should be removed:
The injury inflicted by a segregated school system is inseparable
from the injury inflicted by segregated housing or public accommodations because each reinforces the other and because removal of one
will not heal the injury without the removal of the other. [P. 59.]

Lawrence's analysis is carried furthest in his discussion of the
Court's decision in Washington v. IJavis, 45 which held that the plaintiffs must prove the defendant's intent to discriminate in order to
establish that a police hiring examination violated the fourteenth
amendment. Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Green, 46
Lawrence argues that it should be enough to prove that a segregated
police department had once operated as part of a state-sanctioned
system of segregation and that present underrepresentation of blacks
is a remnant of that system. "The burden would rest on the state to
44. Other scholars have argued that government bears a moral responsibility for present
inequalities due to its failure to outlaw private discrimination. See, e.g., Perry, The JJisproportionate Impact Tlzeo,y of Racial JJiscrimination, 125 U. PA. L. RE.v. 540, 558 (1977).
45. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
.
46. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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prove that they had effectively destroyed the Institution of Segregation . . ." (p. 63).47 This approach, urges Lawrence, would mean
that individuals who benefit from past acts of segregation would take
some responsibility for the system's continuing effects (p. 64).
Lawrence's thesis may be assessed on at least two levels. As a
foundation for a redirection oflitigative efforts to achieve equal educational opportunity, it almost certainly fails. There is no· reason to
believe that the Court that decided Washington v. .Davis and Milliken
v. Bradley48 would adopt Lawrence's broad definition of segregation
and his correlative systemic remedy.49 Nor does Lawrence spell out
in any detail what his remedy might be. Assuming that one could
prove that "[b]lack children in San Francisco do not escape the
stigma when the state calls blacks in Los Angeles inferior" (p. 53),
what follows? That the schools in San Francisco should be integrated? That black children in San Francisco should be compensated for the dignitary harm? That busing in Los Angeles will
remedy the effects of segregation in San Francisco? We are not told.
Similarly, Lawrence argues that state involvement in housing discrimination labels black children's families as inferior and thus "violates [the children's] right to equal educational opportunity under
the Fourteenth Amendment as defined by Brown" (p. 58). Accord47. Lawrence would attribute poorer black performance on the standardized test at issue in

Washington v. JJavis to the existence of a segregated school system in the District of Columbia
until 1954 and a tracking system in the public schools that was not dismantled until 1967. P.
64.
48. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).·
49. The Court has been generally unwilling to analyze racial discrimination in systemic
terms. In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion), the Court rejected a challenge to the at-large election of city commissioners. The plaintiffs argued that the discriminatory nature of the election process was demonstrated in part by the history of official racial
discrimination in Alabama as well as the fact that white commissioners elected under the challenged system discriminated against blacks in municipal employment and in dispensing public
services. Justice Stewart's opinion, which announced the Judgment of the Court and which
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell, disposed of these assertions as follows:
[E)vidence of discrimination [in employment and services) by white officials in Mobile is
relevant only as the most tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional invalidity of the electoral system under wpich they attained their offices.
. . . [Furthermore,] past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental acllon that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains
whether a discriminatory intent has been proved in a given case. More oistant instances
of official discrimination in other cases are of limited help in resolving that question.
446 U.S. at 74 (footnote omitted). See also J. WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 140:
(The Court] might have seen school segregation as a product of prejudice in jobs, housing, politics, public facilities, the military, with discrimination and segregation in each
part of American life reverberating throughout the whole. . . •
But this broad view, which most accurately accounts for present school segregation, is
more congenial to historians than to lawyers. . . . Quite apart from analytical obstacles,
the panoramic view offends the law's caution and pragmatJSm. It suggests that past guilt
is indigenous and universal, and that drastic amends must immediately be made.
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ingly, says Lawrence, an appropriate remedy would be "to include
the school system in formulating [a] remedy" for the housing discrimination (p. 58). Again it is far from clear what sort of remedy is
being proposed: Added funds to schools in areas walled off by discriminatory housing practices? Busing to remedy a neighborhood
school policy that created segregated schools?
On a different level, much can be said for Lawrence's thesis that
state-imposed school segregation is likely to be but a small part of
continuing invidious discrimination against blacks. Jim Crow was
not limited to schools. In the not so distant past, segregation and
discrimination pervaded housing, transportation, recreational facilities, government offices, and the armed services: "White flight" from
"changing neighborhoods" and declining white enrollment in
schools integrated by court decrees evince, at least in part, a lingering ideology that stamps blacks as undesirable neighbors or classmates. To the extent that segregation in the schools is only one
manifestation of the present effects of past segregation, a remedial
strategy limited to guaranteeing racial balance in the classroom will
be unlikely to remove the underlying causes of segregation.
Lawrence recognizes the pervasiveness and durability of the institutional racism that he describes. He knows that his argument for
systemic relief- veritably a Green-ing of America -will not fare
well in the courts.50 He is thus forced to conclude that "[t]he oppressor's understanding of his oppression is limited by self-interest, and
ultimately we must find ways to make an oppression operate against
the self-interest of those in power'' (p. 66). Lawrence's gloomy analysis of the problem and his ambitious solution provide no realistic
way of improving educational opportunities for black children under
the regime of Brown.
D. "The Protection of Class Structure" 51
Alan David Freeman, a visiting professor at the S.U.N.Y. Buffalo Law School, paints with as broad a brush as Lawrence. FreeSO. Theodore Eisenberg's argument that policy reasons justify imposition of a "proximate
cause" requirement in race discrimination cases would severely undercut Lawrence's sweeping
analysis. Eisenberg states that "[i]t would be unjust to inflict the entire cost of undoing past
wrongs on people who are not reasonably responsible for those wrongs. This argument applies
with particular force when the cost is imposed on third parties who had no part in the prior
discrimination." Furthermore, if one accepts the conclusion that not all disproportionate impact is unconstitutional, a proximate cause requirement helps establish workable rules for distinguishing permissible from impermissible uneven impact. Eisenberg, .Disproportionate
Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories ofConstitutional Adjudication, S2 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, S9-60
(1977).
S1. This section reviews Freeman, supra note 30.
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man's piece, a condensation of an article he has published
elsewhere,52 is the most interesting in the collection.
The core of Freeman's analysis is his distinction between the
"perpetrator perspective" and the "victim perspective" - a distinction that turns on one's attention to results. The perpetrator perspective views discrimination as "the atomistic behavior of persons and
institutions who have been abstracted out of actual society as part of
the quest for villains" (p. 74). The perpetrator perspective implies a
simple remedy: neutralize the villains. It also clears most citizens of
responsibility; discrimination is not viewed as systemic or as part of a
social structure that benefits nonminority groups. The solution to
racism, from this perspective, is simply color-blindness.
The victim perspective, on the other hand, focuses on results. To
black Americans in the 1950s, Freeman suggests, Brown must have
promised more than an end to discrimination. It must have fostered
an expectation that when discrimination is finally eradicated, there
would be "some significant change in the conditions of life that one
associates with past practices of discrimination - segregated
schools, lack of jobs, the worst jobs, lack of political power" (p. 73). 53
In tracing the development of antidiscrimination law, Freeman
argues that the Supreme Court's "impatience, fear of embarrassment
[and] desire for some results" (p. 85) led it to "[toy] with the victim
perspective" until the mid 1970s (p. 75). With the decisions in Washington v. .Davis and Mil/iken v. Bradley, however, the Court has
"reasserted the substantive primacy of the perpetrator perspective by
pretending never to have strayed away" (p. 76).
Freeman believes that the Supreme Court's ultimate rejection of
the victim perspective in cases like Mil/iken v. Bradley "can be understood as an instance of law as legitimation of the existing class
structure" (p. 83). The perpetrator perspective "serves to legitimize
(legally and morally) the major institutions that maintain a disproportionate number of black people as an underclass" (pp. 83-84). It
is not obvious, as Freeman notes, that maintenance of a black underclass is in the interests of the ruling class. An underclass is not
needed for strictly economic reasons, and its existence is an embar52. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial .Discrimination Through Ant/discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court .Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
53. Freeman's analysis is somewhat analogous to Owen Fiss's distinction between a process-oriented interpretation (which emphasizes "purification of the decisional process") and
result-oriented interpretation (which emphasizes ''the achievement of a certain result, improvement of the economic and social position of the protected group"). Fiss, The Fate ofAn
Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second .Decade ofter Brown v.
Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 764 (1974).
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rassment to the United States in the world arena. Why, then, has the
victim perspective failed to take hold? Freeman suggests several
answers.54
First, a remedy attuned to results will necessarily have an adverse
effect on others. It is hard to imagine the ruling class burdening itself to any degree; thus, the dislocative impact will be borne primarily by lower-class whites. This redistribution of burdens is likely to
produce "hostility and instability which only coercive force can contain" (p. 85). Since the perpetrator perspective guarantees only the
punishment of villains, not the bestowing of benefits on the underclass, it is far less likely to have a destabilizing effect on class
structure.
Second, Freeman argues, rejection of the victim perspective preserves "a basic presupposition of legal ideology and of the existing
class structure - the legitimacy of vested rights" (p. 85). Vested
rights are not threatened by the perpetrator perspective because that
view "presupposes the innocence of those not implicated, and the
legitimacy of positions of advantage previously obtained" (p. 86).
The perpetrator perspective also protects the "ideology" of equality of opportunity- a concept that Freeman describes as "the major
rationalization of class domination in this country" (p. 86). Equality
of opportunity legitimizes class relationships by presupposing "an
objective, transcendent notion of merit or qualification" (p. 86). It
thus explains the existing class structure in unobjectionable terms as a function of ability, not domination.
· Freeman's attack on equality of opportunity leads him to a position fundamentally at odds with several of the other essays and the
major theme of Shades of Brown. He writes:
[T]he movement for "effective education," however pragmatic the impulse behind it, operates to place responsibility on ''victims" while presupposing a structure of equality of opportunity ready to receive them.
Similarly, I perceive academic efforts to denounce the worth of busing,
extol segregated schools as representative ·of "American pluralism,"
and recast the issue of Brown as never having had to do with anything
but the measurable "effectiveness" of education, as, however sincerely
offered, a structural part of the same process of rationalization represented by the recent Supreme Court cases. [Pp. 87-88.]

For Freeman, to reinterpret Brown as mandating quality education
simply reinforces the regime of equality of opportunity by accepting
merit as a legitimate explanation and justification for class structure.
54. Freeman rejects the parlor Marxist explanation that racism is "rationally useful to keep
the class structure intact" because it serves as a ''necessarily divisive ideology for blocking
access to class consciousness." P. 84.
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Freeman's analysis is insightful, but open to challenge. Elsewhere, he has applied the victim/perpetrator distinction to areas of
racial discrimination other than schools. 55 Whatever strength it has
in those areas,56 the analysis seems weak in the context of school
cases. At least insofar as the Court is defining the constitutional violation, the Denver, Columbus, and Dayton cases create broad, al- •
most irrebuttable, presumptions in favor of plainti.ffs. 57
But Freeman's argument has force on a deeper level. While it
may be true that the Court has facilitated proof of unlawful school
segregation, this says little about the kind of remedy granted after a
violation has been established. Freeman's point is that the perpetrator perspective will not produce substantive remedies no matter how
easily proved the violation because such remedies threaten the
American class structure.
His argument finds unlikely support in Nathan Glazer's Affirmative .Discrimination - a book that is a paean to the perpetrator perspective. 58 Glazer recognizes the destabilizing effect on American
society that acceptance of the victim perspective would have:
Many assert that [the development of affirmative action into requirements for even statistical distribution in employment and education] is
essential if the promise of real freedom and equality for the blacks and
other American minority groups is to be fulfilled. I have argued . . .
that equal opportunity, not even statistical distribution, is the proper
objective of public policy. That argument can be made on constitutional [and] ... pragmatic grounds. . . . And that argument can also
be made on political grounds: that equal opportunity represents the
broadest consensus possible in a multiethnic and yet highly integrated
society, and that this consensus would be broken if requirements for
statistical representation were to become a permanent part of American law and public policy.59
55. See Freeman, supra note 52.
56. The Court, while tightening the definition of a constitutional violation, has sanctioned
broad remedial federal legislation in the voting and employment areas. Thus, even though the
Constitution might not embody the victim perspective, it apparently does not prohibit Congress from enacting statutes that do. Compare Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), with City
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), with
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 449
(1979).
57. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Denver); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
58. N. GLAZER, supra note 3. Glazer, however, would strenuously disagree with Freeman's reading of the cases; he believes that the Court, through imposition of statistical requirements, has in fact enthroned the victim perspective. Id. at 33-167.
59. Id. at 168-69. Glazer describes the bitterness between blacks and "ethnic" white
groups in raw terms:
From the point of view of the white ethnics, they entered a society in which they were
scorned; they nevertheless worked hard, they received little or no support from government or public agencies, their children received no special attention in school or special
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Despite Glazer's fear that affirmative action has produced a constitutional commitment to results, Freeman is right that the Court
has never really transcended the equality-of-opportunity construct.
Brown itself is the best example. The question framed by the Court
was not, "Does the denial to black children of a decent education or
an education equal to that provided whites violate the fourteenth
amendment?" It was, instead, "Does segregation of children in public schools . . . deprive the children of the minority groups of equal
educational opportunities?"60 Answering the question in the affirmative merely insists that white and black students be offered the same
educational programs. Indeed, this was a primary purpose of the
integration remedy: to ensure that a black child receives the same
education that a white child receives. Focusing on "opportunity"
permits the courts to ignore the value of the education. Brown is not
read as requiring that school systems graduate black students fully
equipped to function in American society. Nor does the "equal opportunity'' approach examine whether black children enter the educational process at a comparative disadvantage and thus are less able
to benefit from the "equal'' education provided.61 When plaintiffs
began to raise these types of issues, the courts slammed the door on
the argument that the Constitution embraced a fundamental right to
education or guaranteed equal educational results. 62
If the victim perspective and the concept of equality of opportunity embodied in Brown are incompatible, it is clear why Freeman
does not attempt to return to the "true meaning" of Brown. Even
recasting Brown as guaranteeing an "effective education'' would produce a remedy that merely equips blacks to compete in the existing
meritocracy. Under this interpretation, Brown loses its potential for
critiquing race or class domination.
opportunity to attend college, they received no special consideration from courts and legal
defenders. They contrast their situation with that of blacks and other minority groups
today and see substantial differences in treatment. They consider themselves patriotic and
appreciative of the United States even though they received no special benefit. They look
at the minority groups and find them abusive of the state thou~ they do receive special
benefit. This may be a crude and unfair comparison; after all, tne blacks were brought in
chains as slaves and the whites came as free men, blacks have continually dealt with the
most severe and unbending prejudice, whereas that met by immigrants was mild and
scarcely to be found after the second generation, and we could continue the comparison.
But the perception cannot be dismissed as false either, and however we disagree over how
"true" it is historically, it plays a great weight in politics and in the belief of white ethnic
groups that they are subject to unfair policies.
Nothing is so powerful in the modem world as the perception of unfairness.
Id. at 194-95.
60. 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
61. See text at notes 87-95 infra.
62. See cases cited in note 36 supra.
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What Freeman seeks is not fulfillment of Brown's promise of
equal educational opportunity. He seeks instead the realization of
black perceptions of what Brown symbolized: substantive improvements in the lives of black people. This result, he acknowledges, is
unlikely to be achieved through litigation (p. 83). Freeman, then, is
as pessimistic as Lawrence about the likelihood of achieving meaningful results through the courts. But Freeman goes a step further by
directly challenging the goal sought by the other contributors to
Shades of Brown. For him, an "effective education" is meaningless
unless one is willing to confront the ideology that supports and justifies prevailing class relations - equality of opportunity. If Freeman
is correct, the programmatic suggestions of Shades ofBrown must be
viewed as ultimately self-defeating.
But one need not go this far. It seems clear that improving the
quality of education provided to black children is a legitimate shortterm goal that can only facilitate the achievement of one's long-term
goal, whatever it might be (Carter's is integration; Freeman's, an end
to class oppression). Freeman may be right about the intractability
of the American class structure and its supporting ideologies. But
this should not stop the effort, as Bell describes it in the Introduction,
to "move school desegregation policies toward alternative visions of
what Brown and its promise might still mean for those who need it
most" (p. x) - that is, a decent education for black children.
E.

"The Relationship to White Interests" 63

In addition to introductory notes, Bell contributes an essay and a
model alternative desegregation plan. In "Brown and the InterestConvergence Dilemma,"64 he seeks to answer Herbert Wechsler's
challenge to develop a neutral principle that decides Brown.65 He
offers what he terms a principle of "interest convergence":
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites; however, the
fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial
remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy
sought threatens the superior societal status of middle- and upper-class
whites. [P. 95.]

The interests that converged in Brown, according to Bell, were black
interests in ending segregation and white interests in answering the
63. This Section reviews Bell, supra note 30.
64. P. 91. This essay may also be found at 93 HARV, L. REV. 518 (1980). See also D, BELL,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 437-44 (2d ed. 1980),
65. See Wechsler, supra note 2.
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attack of Communism on American racism, in reassuring blacks returning from World War II that notions of equality and freedom
might be realized at home, and in helping the South transform itself
from a rural to an industrial society.
Fulfillment of Brown, however, breeds interest-divergence. Bell
argues, as does Freeman, that racial equality comes at a price to
whites, who must sacrifice local school policies and resources. This
divergence was manifest in massive Southern defiance of desegregation orders. The defiance was initially met with the full force of judicial power;66 but once judicial supremacy had been reestablished, the
Court began to erect barriers (such as the intent requirement) to limit Brown in the face of growing white opposition.
Bell believes that white and black interests are more likely to
converge in the context of a remedial strategy that focuses on equality of educational opportunity than on racial balance.67 Although
Bell does not so state, one can infer that whites may be willing to buy
their way out of busing by supporting improvement of educational
programs in predominantly black schools. The Department of Justice has apparently recognized the likelihood of convergence implicit
in Bell's approach. It has recently announced that it will no longer
seek "mandatory busing" in school cases; instead, it will concentrate
its efforts on school districts that provide inferior education in minority schools. 6 8
Both Bell and the Administration have understandably been accused of returning, not to Brown, but to Plessy v. Ferguson. It is a
charge that Bell does not wholly deny:
Desegregation remedies that do not integrate may seem to step backward toward the Plessy "separate but equal" era. Some black educators, however, see major educational benefits in schools where black
children, parents, and teachers can utilize the real cultural strengths of
66. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering desegregation of the Little Rock,
Ark. schools).
67. It is interesting that both Bell and John W. Davis (arguing on behalf of segregated
schools in Brown) have quoted with approval W.E.B. DuBois's 1935 article, Does the Negro
Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328 (1935). See ARGUMENT, supra note 17, at 51;
Bell, Serving .1wo Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Lili•
gation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 515 (1976).
68. See U.S. May Sue Boards on Schooling Equality, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1981, at 10, col. 1.
q: Taylor, Lawyers Assail U.S. Stand on Chicago School Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, at
14, coL 3 (reporting that William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Civil Rights division of the Justice Department said: "Any students who want to have an
integrated education ought to have it. But if there are students out there who do not want an
integrated education, we should not be compelling them to get on a bus to have one."). The
Reagan Administration has also announced that it will no longer rely on the "Keyes presumption" in desegregation suits. U.S. Alters Policy on Desegregation: Integration of Whole District
Won't Be Pursued ff Only a Portion is Involved, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at 9, col. 1.
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the black community to overcome the many barriers to educational
achievement. [P. 101.]

He has written elsewhere that the separate-but-equal doctrine of
Plessy was "re-oriented," but not overruled in Brown,69 and that
"[t]he principles of Plessy v. Ferguson as well as [those of] Brown v.
Board of Education can be used effectively." 70
Bell's argument is aimed primarily at civil rights attorneys. For
the past decade, he has criticized the single-minded pursuit of integration.71 His attacks have drawn heavy fire from his former colleagues in the civil rights bar72 - "a fact," as he puts it, "that has
brought me much sadness" (p. 136). But clearly he is no traitor to
the movement. Bell's plan is obviously not to return to the unequal
days of Plessy, but rather to resurrect the educational promise of
Brown. Such a strategy, he believes, will accord more closely to the
wishes of black parents, will be more likely to provide black children
with a decent education, and will be less likely to provoke the strenuous opposition of whites.
There is interesting evidence that Bell's views are gaining adherents among minority groups involved in school cases. In a recent
district court opinion in the unending Dallas desegregation litigation, the court noted the intervention of a new party, the Black Coalition to Maximize Education. 73 The court described the Black
Coalition as "a broad-based minority community group composed
of parents, patrons and taxpayers with children in the [Dallas school
district], as well as representatives from a number of civic, political
and ecumenical associations in the black community."74 After quoting a statement in one of Bell's articles to the effect that courts
should recognize the "growing disagreement in black communities
over the nature of school relief," the court stated:
By its intervention in this lawsuit, the Black Coalition merely gives
formal recognition to the same undercurrents of tension and disunity
among blacks that were experienced over the lengthy course of desegregation litigation in such large cities as Atlanta, Detroit, Nashville
and Boston . . . .
The Black Coalition represents a substantial body of blacks who
are opposed to any escalation in the use of racial balance remedies to
cure the effects of school segregation. The Coalition prefers remedies
69. See Bell, supra note 29, at 353.
10. Id. at 373.
11. See generally Bell, supra note 21; Bell, supra note 67.
12. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 5.
73. Tasliy v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 689 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
74. 520 F. Supp. at 689.
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designed to improve educational quality and to eliminate the disparity
in academic achievement that can be attributed to past segregation, as
alternatives to remedies that require public assignments to noncontiguous attendance zones and mandatory transportation. 75

The court went on to find that further busing to desegregate the Dallas schools was not feasible due to considerations of time, distance,
and demographic trends. The position taken by the Black Coalition
clearly made the court's decision easier: "[T]he imposition of
mandatory transportation on minority parents and children who are
opposed to such a remedy is unfair and paternalistic."76
It appears, then, that judges - faced with massive white opposition, declining respect for their orders, and the prospect of burdensome superintendency of a school system - may use disunity in the
minority ranks as a reason for denying traditional remedies in desegregation cases. To ensure that his criticism of current desegregation
policies does not create a remedial void, Bell must provide a compelling theory that authorizes and justifies new remedies in school cases.
He meets this challenge by proposing a "model alternative desegregation plan" in the final chapter of Shades of Brown.
Ill.

PUTTING EDUCATION INTO DESEGREGATION

A. Bell's "Model Alternative Desegregation ~Ian"

Bell's proposal would require the establishment of a small committee of educators, minority parents, a social scientist, and perhaps
a lawyer77 to draft an alternative desegregation plan based on the
community's comments. The plan would "aim to bring minority
schools up to the academic standards of mainly white schools in the
district," provide for strong, dynamic school board leadership and
75. 520 F. Supp. at 690 (footnotes omitted).
76. 520 F. Supp. at 733. The changing perspective of minority representatives is also apparent in recent developments in the Nashville desegregation litigation. In an opinion handed
down in May 1980, the district judge noted that a "dramatic role reversal has taken place" in
the twenty-five-year-old litigations:
Historically, black plaintiffs felt the necessity to be in a majority white school in order to
be assured of equal distribution of educational funding. The assertion and recognition of
the right to equal protection of the laws has rendered this reason irrelevant in today's
climate • . . . In this case, we have a white majority in the school board, acting on the
advice of a white desegregation expert, recommending to the Court more bussing to
achieve more racial balance. Equally contrary to earlier posture, the black plaintiffs' urge
upon the Court less bussing, more neighborhood characteristics to the assignment plan,
and the permissibility of majority black schools.
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 492 F. Supp. 167, 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (emphasis in original).
77. Bell states that "a lawyer knowledgeable in school desegregation law, but sympathic to
the idea of alternative desegregation plans could prove a helpful addition to the committee,
but may prove difficult to find." P. 129.
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parent involvement, ensure equalization of funding between white
and black schools, and include a "majority to minority provision" to
give black parents the right to have their children attend predominantly white schools (p. 130). Plans could also include bilingual and
bicultural courses, vocational training and counseling components,
and new disciplinary procedures for school districts in which disproportionate numbers of black children are suspended or expelled (p.
131).
Bell's strategy of attaching educational components to desegregation remedies has been approved by the Supreme Court. In Milliken
II, 18 the Court sanctioned such provisions in a decree that required
the Detroit school board to adopt reading programs and end discriminatory examinations. The Court also approved the establishment of in-service training programs for staff and counseling
programs for students to help with the desegregation effort.79 Lower
courts have relied on Milliken II in ordering similar educational
components. so
While Milliken II appears to indicate the feasibility of Bell's
plan, it actually demonstrates the weakness of the strategy. Unlike
Carter, Bell does not argue for a new definition of the right recognized in Brown; he does not contend that a plaintiff showing that he
or she is receiving a poor education has established a violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Rather, he proposes a new remedy once a
court has found unlawful segregation in a school system. Thus, the
efficacy of his proposal depends upon the ability of plaintiffs to continue to demonstrate unconstitutional segregation. There are, however, indications that we are approaching the end of the road for
desegregation suits. Indeed, it appears that the judicial intervention
so vigorously contested by school districts can now serve as a shield
against charges of unlawful racial imbalance. This occurs in the following way.
Once the plaintiffs prove unlawful segregation, Green demands
"root and branch" dismantling of the dual system. Since Swann, this
78. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
79. 433 U.S. at 283-88. There is less to Milliken II than meets the eye. The petitioner in
the case was the State of Michigan, which had been ordered by the district court to pay half the
cost of the remedial program ($5.8 million). The school board joined the plaintiffs in seeking
affirmance of the district court decree. Justice Powell, in his separate opinion, stated that the
board and the plaintiffs had 'joined forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from
the State treasury." 433 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 767-74 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
923 (1980); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 741-42 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 511 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-71 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Reed v. Rhodes, 455
F. Supp. 569, 597-602 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
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has meant some form of racial balance in the schools. To ensure
effective desegregation, district courts often review and direct the activities of school authorities for a substantial period of time. Under
the court's close supervision, a range of remedial activities may be
undertaken, such as the redrawing of school zones and feeder patterns, busing, and the establishment of so-called "magnet" schools.
At some point, the court will become convinced that the dual system
has been obliterated - that the school system has purged itself of all
vestiges of segregation. The court can then attribute any subsequent
resegregation - absent a radical shift in district policies - to private
choices, not impermissible state action. If racial imbalance reappears, it will be nonactionable.
The Court, as long ago as Swann, indicated that judicial supervision of a school district should end once a "unitary" system had been
achieved. 81 This was made more explicit in Pasadena City Board of
Education v. Spangler, 82 where the Court held that the district court
had exceeded its authority in requiring annual readjustment of attendance zones to guarantee that there be no school in Pasadena
with a majority of minority members. The Court stated:
[H]aving once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in
order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of
the defendants, the District Court had fully performed its function of
providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially discriminatory
attendance patterns. 83

District courts, faced with seemingly unending supervision of school
systems, have begun to find that school boards have met the Swann
test. 84 Although some of these attempts to withdraw jurisdiction
81. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971):
At some point, these school authorities and others like them should achieve full compliance with this Court's decision in Brown I. The systems would then be "unitary" in the
sense required by our [earlier] decisions . . . .
It does not follow that the communities served by such systems will remain demographically stable, for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of
the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been
accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future
problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other
agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to
affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should
not be necessary.
82. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
83. 427 U.S. at 436-37.
84. See Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. South Park
Independent School Dist., 491 F. Supp. 1177 (E.D. Tex. 1980), revrl. sub nom. United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1981); Liddell v. Board of Educ., 469 F. Supp.
1304, 1360-64 (E.D. Mo. 1979), revrl. sub nom. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.
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have been rejected by the courts of appeals, 85 it seems likely that
"purge cases" will appear with increasing frequency in the days
ahead.
The result, of course, will be irremediable racially imbalanced
schools. Once the current crop of desegregation cases run their
course, Bell will be left with no decrees to which he can append his
educational components. Litigation will return to the pre-Brown
strategy of "equalization," that is, demonstrating that black schools
have funding, programs, or staffs inferior to those of white schools.
But even these lawsuits are unlikely to be effective. First, there is
little evidence that predominantly black schools are receiving lower
per-pupil allotments than white schools in the same district. 86 Furthermore, in inner-city school districts, there may simply be no majority white schools with which to make a comparison. In short,
under a regime that recognizes purge and demands only equalization, the blatant inadequacies of inner-city schools will become
largely immune to fourteenth amendment challenge.

B. The Undiscoverable Right to an Effective or Equal Education
The preceding bleak line of reasoning follows from Bell's strategy of proposing a new remedy rather than attempting to redefine
the underlying right at issue in Brown. An apparently simple solution would be to argue that Brown, or the fourteenth amendment,
guarantees a quality education. But Bell is no doubt aware that the
courts have firmly rejected this argument. In San Antonio Independent School .District v. Rodriguez, the Court held that education is not
a "fundamental right" protected by the fourteenth amendment, and
that interdistrict comparisons of educational quality are not subject
to constitutional scrutiny. 87
But even if the fourteenth amendment does not embrace a right
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1981). q: Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 584 F.2d 78
(5th Cir. 1978) (upholding the district court's finding of a unitary system).
85. See the South Park and Liddell cases cited in note 84 supra.
86. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. III. 1974) (average disparity in
per-pupil expenditures between white and black schools in Chicago approximately one percent; complaint dismissed); I B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, W. SCANLON & M. COHEN, PUBLIC
SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVES 271-308 (1972) (finding
that while a district's discretionary funds may be concentrated in schools serving higher-income, low-minority neighborhoods, state and federal compensatory funds are directed to
lower-income, high-minority schools).
87. 411 U.S. I (1973). Indeed, Bell has been told this before. In response to his earlier
criticism of the civil rights bar for pursuing integration instead of education, see Bell, supra
note 67, Nathaniel Jones, then NAACP General Counsel, wrote: ''The Bell indictment of civil
rights lawyers . . . fails . . . most conspicuously for the simple reason that there is no cause of
action for educational quality per se." Jones, supra note 5, at 379.
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to a quality education, we may be able to interpret the guarantee of
"equal educational opportunity" in such a way as to advance the
cause of improved education for black children. 88 A number of social scientists have suggested that a proper definition of equal opportunity would take into account unequal starting positions of white
and black students. 89 Equal opportunity under this interpretation
would not mean simply that white and black students should be provided the same educational package or that per-pupil expenditures
should be equalized. Rather, equal educational opportunity would
mean the attainment of certain minimal standards of proficiency that
would enable initially disadvantaged students to compete on more
equal terms upon leaving school. Students would thus be entitled to
different educational programs depending upon how far away they
start from acceptable levels of academic achievement. As James
Coleman has written, this perspective requires transformation of the
view of the school from "an agency within which the child is taught"
to an agency "responsible for seeing that the child leams." 90 This
conception of equal educational opportunity might make it possible
for the courts to chart a middle course between the quality sought by
Bell (but denied by Rodriguez) and the equality cum integration demanded by current interpretations of Brown. Brown could be read
as guaranteeing a right to educational programs that compensate for
the unequal starting positions of blacks and whites.
While this may be a plausible reading of the fourteenth amendment, it is not one that the courts are likely to adopt. Such an interpretation would place an intolerable burden on the judiciary to
examine initial inequalities, plan special curricula to meet the needs
of disadvantaged students, and undertake on-going evaluations of
the particular educational programs chosen.91 As one court has
88. There is no agreed-upon definition of equal educational opportunity. For collections
of different formulations, see Coleman, The Concept ofEquality ofEducational Opportunity, 38
HARV. EDUC. REV. 7 (1968); McDermott & Klein, The Cost-Quality .Debate in School Finance
Litigation: .Do .Dollars Make a .Difference?, 38 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 415, 416-23 (1974);
Mosteller & Moynihan,A Pathbreaking Report, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTU•
NITY, supra note 38, at 6-7.
89. Edmund Gordon, for instance, has written, "[e)qual educational opportunity demands
that, where what children bring to school is unequal, what the school puts in must be unequal
and individualized to insure that what the school produces is at least equal at the basic levels
of achievement." Gordon, Toward .Defining Equality of Educational Opportunity, in ON
EQUALITY !)F EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 38, at 423, 433.
90. Coleman, Responsibility of the Schools in the Provision of Equal Educational Opportunity, in EDUCATION FOR WHOM?, supra note 23, at 100, 107.
91. Commentators have argued that the measurement of educational need and value is
beyond the competence of the judiciary. See, e.g., Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and
the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 411, 472-85 (1973).
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stated:
[T]he courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the
power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of . . . students throughout the state. We can only see to it that the outlays for
one group are not invidiously greater or less than that of another. 92
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court has summarily
affirmed the dismissal of two suits that claimed that the fourteenth
amendment requires states to fund school systems based on the educational needs of the students. 93
It is thus understandable why Bell's strategy for a better education for black children involves adding an educational component to
traditional desegregation remedies rather than redefining the right at
issue. 94 As the Detroit and Dallas cases demonstrate, Bell's strategy
can spark an important shift in thinking about desegregation remedies; the inclusion of compensatory and remedial programs may
have a substantial impact on the educational opportunities of blacks.
But ultimately Bell's plan, focused as it is on remedies, can achieve
only short-term results. "White flight" and "purge" will, at some
point in the near future, mean the end for traditional desegregation
efforts. When racial imbalance becomes nonactionable, Bell's remedial strategy will dissolve. 95
92. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969) (three-judge court), o.ffd.
per curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970). See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 I
U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973).
93. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970), o.ffg.percuriam, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va.
1969); Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), a.ffg. per curiam, Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.
Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
94. Bell's proposed model decree would "aim to bring minority schools up to the academic
standards of mainly white schools in the districts." P. 130. This nebulous formulation is
spelled out later when Bell suggests that "[t]he courts, school boards, and concerned parents
can utilize standard test-score results to measure the improvement in effectiveness of black
schools. They might also note dropout rates; disciplinary statistics; the percentage of graduates
going on to college, training programs and/or into full-time employment; and similar measures." P. 137. These factors are identified in order to define appropriate remedial components,
not the fourteenth amendment violation.
95. It is surprising that, in the face of Rodriguez, Bell does not recall the 0. Henry ending
to Henry Hart's classic ./Jialectic: "the state courts." Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction ofFederal Courts: An Exercise in ./Jialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953).
Under state constitutions, a number of state supreme courts have ordered the inter-district
equalization of financing that was denied in Rodriguez. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359
(1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473,303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle
School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Washakie County School
Dist. No. One v. Hershler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1981). These
cases may have a greater potential for permanently improving educational opportunities in
predominantly minority school districts than further federal desegregation suits. However, not
all state courts have been persuaded to grant such relief. See Shofstall v. Hollins, I IO Ariz. 88,
515 P.2d 590 (1973); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Board of
Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980);
Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360
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CONCLUSION

It would be a mistake to allow the present conflict over the benefits of further school desegregation to cloud Brown's achievements.
Brown, quite simply, buried Jim Crow. It would also be a mistake to
cling uncritically to our original understanding of Brown. That understanding, in the minds and arguments of those who litigated and
decided Brown, was that education and integration were inextricably
linked. But the hopes and theories that bound these two concepts
have been buffeted for more than two decades by demographics and
politics. As a result, integration has been rendered virtually unattainable in large urban areas. These facts have led the contributors
to Shades of Brown to chart a new course for Brown - one that
seeks to ensure that education does not go down tied to the mast of
the integration ship.
The essays adopt different approaches in attempting to reinterpret Brown. Carter and Ravitch seek to redefine the right at issue in
Brown. Lawrence and Freeman argue that racial discrimination in
schools must be understood as part of a larger social phenomenon,
and that desegregation remedies will fail if they do not attack the
system as a whole. Bell sets out a remedial plan that can be implemented under the current law. These approaches, as should be apparent from the preceding discussion, sometimes conflict with one
another and vary in likelihood of success in the courts. But the significance of Shades ofBrown lies not in the cogency of any particular
essay; the essays are more suggestive than persuasive. The book's
significance lies in the fact that seven scholars dedicated to education
and the vindication of civil rights can begin to question the prevailing liberal interpretation of Brown, the interpretation that · has
shaped three decades of litigation and had massive social
consequences.
Shades of Brown is successful in returning our attention to the
educational aspects of Brown. The problem is that the essays do not
provide a convincing solution to the problem they identify. Courts
are unlikely to accept Carter's attempt to make Brown into a case
that requires the evaluation of the benefits of the educational process. BeWs plan is modest and short-term at best. Lawrence is aware
that his systemic remedy cannot b~ achieved through the courts.
And Freeman recognizes that a guarantee of substantive results is
(1979). Furthermore, the relationship of "dollars spent'' to "quality achieved" remains problematic. See McDermott & Klein, supra note 88, at 423-54.
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fundamentally inconsistent with the prevailing regime of equality of
opportunity.
A decade ago, Alexander Bickel prophesied that "Brown v. Board
of Education, with emphasis on the education part of the title, may
be headed for - dread word - irrelevance." 96 Although Bickel's
prediction appears accurate as a judicial matter, 97 there exist other
arenas for achieving important social goals: the political branches of
local, state, and federal governments. If Shades of Brown is persuasive in stimulating reconsideration of the single-minded pursuit of
integration, resources expended in desegregation suits could be
rededicated to a political fight for improving educational opportunities afforded black children. Nonjudicial institutions may ultimately
prove no more interested than the courts in the quality of education
in inner-city schools. But we should not close the book on Brown
simply because the courts refuse to write the next chapter.

96. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 151 (1970),
97. Dean Read has perceptively observed:
[T]he problem of providing equal educational opportunities to all defies a legal solution
based solely on a race theory of equal protection. As long as "blackness" and poverty are
inescapably linked, and as long as minority plaintiffs cannot themselves agree on the
proper remedy, perhaps the twenty year effort to implement the promise of Brown has, in
fact, reached its logical conclusion. The problems of school segregation in the cities may
be so intractable that one tool - the constitutional co=and of equal educational opportunity for all races articulated in Brown - cannot and should not be expected to solve
alone the problem of segregated education. Until new tools are found and implemented
- a negative income tax or experimentation with John Rawls' theories of distributive
justice or some other, yet unborn, idea - it is at least arguable that the limits have been
reached in using the Constitution alone as a means for attaining school desegregation.
Read, Judicial Evolution ofthe Law ofSchool Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 48-49 (1975) (footnotes omitted).

